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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to summarize the information currently available on 
cocaine production and trafficking. The chapter starts by describing the available data 
on  cocaine  production  and  trade, the collection  methodologies,  (if  available)  used by 
different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. 
Next, the chapter states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding 
cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data matches these 
hypotheses. Also, the chapter states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and 
studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should 
guide  future  research  into  our  understanding  of  the  key  determinants  of  illicit  drug 
production  and  trafficking.  Finally,  the  chapter  studies  the  different  policies  that 
producer  countries  have  adopted  to  fight  against  cocaine  production  and  the  role 
consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies. 
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INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION       
       
The nature of illegal and black markets makes it very difficult to collect 
data  such  as  quantities  transacted,  intermediate  and  final  good’s  prices,  and 
other relevant market characteristics like the quality of the product being dealt 
and the distribution of profits within the industry. Illegal drug markets are not 
the exception.
1 For instance, in measuring consumption “buyers cannot report a 
price in dollars per standardized unit, but only how much they spent on some 
quantity  of  white  powder,  the  contents  of  which  is  unknown.”  (Reuter  and 
Greenfield, 2001, p. 169).  Notwithstanding the difficulties of collecting accurate 
data, the market’s numbers on the size, quantities, prices, etc. always attract a 
good  deal  of  attention,  not  only  among  policy  makers  who  want  to  request 
appropriations,  governments  that  want  to  measure  the  success  of  anti-drug 
policies and analysts who want to identify the claimants of the business’ profits, 
but  also  from  journalists  who  want  to  impress  the  public.  Many  times  the 
numbers are, voluntarily or not, misused “to buttress preconceived and personal 
agendas” and “the emotional and ideological charge carried by most data users 
leads to widespread data misuse.” (Thoumi, 2005a, p. 186).   
This chapter describes the available data to measure the incidence and 
prevalence of cocaine production and trafficking. It also describes the main data 
sources, the collection methodologies, if available, and examines the accuracy and 
biases of different data sources.  Based on the description of the data and its 
biases,  the  chapter  states  some  key  empirical  questions  and  hypotheses  that 
should  drive  future  research  into  our  understanding  of  the  determinants  of 
cocaine production and trafficking, and of the outcomes and side effects of the 
war  against  illegal  drugs.  Some  of  the  questions  and  hypotheses  that  are 
addressed  in  this  chapter  are:  If  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  is  a  crucial 
parameter of the effectiveness of the war on drugs, what are the short- and long-
term  price  elasticities  of  demand  for  cocaine?  What  are  the  productivity 
parameters behind the estimation of potential cocaine production? Have illegal 
                                                 
1 See Reuter (2001) and Thoumi (2005a).   3 
drug producers made technological advances in the production of cocaine that 
counteract the measures taken in the war on drugs? What are the results of the 
war against illegal drugs? Is this war sustainable in the long run? What are the 
side effects of this war? 
The chapter also studies the outcomes of the war against the production of 
cocaine  in  the  producer  countries,  the  role  of  consumer  countries  (mostly 
developed) in the implementation of specific anti-dug policies, and examines the 
effectiveness of these policies and some of their possible side effects. Finally, the 
chapter  briefly  discusses  the  sustainability  of  policies  aimed  at  reducing  the 
production  of  cocaine  in  source  countries.  Before  describing  the  data  and 
collection methodologies, we turn to describing some basic information about the 
main topic of this chapter: cocaine. 
 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COCAINE  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COCAINE  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COCAINE  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COCAINE        
 
Cocaine is a powerful addictive drug that is produced in large quantities in 
only a few Latin American countries. These are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
2 
The  main  ingredient  to  produce  cocaine  is  the  cocaine  alkaloid,  a  chemical 
compound that can be extracted from the leaves of coca plants.
3  Coca was grown 
in the Andes long before the arrival of European settlers. Its leaves were (and, in 
some cases, still are) chewed by the local indigenous population in the Americas 
to  help  relieve  fatigue  caused  by  altitude  sickness  and  for  its  mild  stimulant 
effects.  Today, prevailing indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru still use 
coca leaves in religious and social ceremonies.
4  
The  coca  plant  is  a  very  hardy,  medium-sized  bush  that  grows  in  a 
tropical  rainforest  climate  anywhere  between  100  and  1700  meters  above  sea 
                                                 
2 The purpose of this chapter is not to explain why illegal drug production takes place in some countries 
while not in others. Francisco Thoumi has extensively examined this topic (see Thoumi 2003, 2005a, b). 
3 The cocaine alkaloid was first isolated in the West in 1855 by German chemist Friedrich Gaedcke. Five 
years later Albert Niemann described an improved isolation process of the cocaine alkaloid for his Ph.D. 
thesis and named it “cocaine” (see http://cocaine.org/ and the references there cited). 
4 See Thoumi (2005c) for a detailed explanation of how anti-drug policies create a cultural clash between 
government agencies interested in fighting cocaine production and local native populations that have grown 
and used coca in traditional cultural and religious ceremonies for a long time.   4 
level. The time between planting and harvesting ranges from six and nine months 
depending on the coca variety, climate and geographical conditions. Coca bushes 
can be grown and harvested year-round, but most growth occurs from December 
to April. Coca is harvested, on average, four times per year (minimum — three 
and maximum —  eight, depending on the variety and location of the coca) and 
requires up to 300 man-days to harvest one hectare — about 2.5 acres — for one 
year (CIA, 2004).  
Although there are over 250 different varieties of the coca plant, only a 
few  are  widely  used  today  to  produce  cocaine  for  the  illegal  drug  markets.
5 
Cocaine production is a relatively simple process that can take place in small 
local workshops. The process of producing cocaine consists of three main steps: 
after being harvested and dried, the coca leaves are converted into coca paste, 
then  into  cocaine  base,  and  then  into  the  final  product,  cocaine  (cocaine 
hydrochloride). The manufacturing process requires a few chemicals (precursors) 
such as sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate, ether, hydrochloric acid, acetone 
and ethyl ether, plus water, filters, and microwave ovens.  
Depending on different factors such as coca variety, geography, bushes per 
hectare, etc., one hectare planted with coca bushes produces, on average, between 
1,000 and 1,200 kg of fresh coca leaf per hectare per harvest. Between 1.1 and 1.4 
grams of cocaine can be produced from 1 kg of coca leaf.  Using an average of 
four  harvests  per  year,  and  the  yields  described  above,  we  can  arrive  at  a 
ballpark production estimate between 5 and 6 kg of cocaine per hectare per year.
6 
Cocaine hydrochloride, a white crystalline powder,
7 is a highly potent and 
addictive stimulant.
8 It is either snorted or dissolved in water and injected. Due 
                                                 
5 These are the Huanuco coca (in Bolivia and Peru), the Amazonian coca (in the Amazon River Basin), and 
Colombian coca (in Colombia, primarily) (https://www.cia.gov/saynotodrugs/cocaine_b.html). 
6 These yields numbers were taken from different reports (CIA, 2004 and UNODC, 2005). The number 
used by UNODC to calculate potential production of cocaine in Colombia was 4.7 kg of cocaine per 
hectare per year until 2004, which, according to the source, is taken from a study undertaken by the US 
government under the name of “Operation Breakthrough”. However, recent field research carried out by 
UNODC in Colombia has found a large increase in this productivity estimate. In fact, for the 2006 report, 
UNODC uses a productivity estimate of 7.7 kg of cocaine per hectare per year. We will elaborate on this 
below. 
7 Commonly used street terms for cocaine are: blow, coke, snow, nose candy, flake, big C, lady, snowbirds, 
and wicky stick (see www.dea.gov/concern/cocaine_factsheet.html, and www.streetdrugs.org).   5 
to the high price of cocaine, by the late seventies and beginning of the eighties 
drug  dealers  discovered  a  new  and  cheaper  alternative  for  low  income  users: 
crack, a rocky crystal that is obtained by mixing cocaine, baking soda, and water 
in a saucepan, and whose name derives from the crackling sound produced when 
the ingredients are being burned to smoke the resulting vapors (see Levitt and 
Dubner, 2005, and NIDA, 2005).  
Cocaine  is  the  second  most  consumed  illegal  drug  in  the  US  (after 
marihuana)  and  the  third  in  most  European  countries  (after  marihuana  and 
heroin).  Cocaine  consumption  triggers  different  physical  effects.  In  moderate 
doses  it  causes  disturbances  in  heart  rates,  elevated  blood  pressure,  dilated 
pupils, decreased appetite, irritability and argumentative behavior, among others. 
In large doses it causes loss of coordination, collapse, blurred vision, dizziness, 
anxiety,  heart  attacks,  chest  pain,  respiratory  failure,  strokes,  seizures  and 
headaches, abdominal pain, nausea, and paranoia.
9 The duration of the euphoric 
effect of cocaine (“the high”) depends on the route of administration. With faster 
absorption, the high is more intense, but does not last as long. When snorted, 
“the high” can last from 15 to 30 minutes; when smoked it can last from about 5 
to 10 minutes (NIDA, 2006). 
 
DATA SOURCES DATA SOURCES DATA SOURCES DATA SOURCES       
 
There  are  two  main  sources  of  data  for  illegal  drug  production, prices, 
extent of cultivation of illegal crops, seizures of drug shipments, etc. These are 
the  United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  (UNODC)  and  the  US 
government’s White House Office of Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). In addition 
to these two sources, other institutions, many times government departments in 
producer  countries,  either  gather  their  own  statistics  or  collaborate  in  the 
gathering of data with UNODC and/or ONDCP. 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 The stimulation produced by cocaine consumption comes from its interference with the reabsorption 
process of dopamine, which is a chemical messenger that is associated with pleasure and movement 
(National Institute of Drug Abuse – NIDA). 
9 NIDA, 2006 and www.streetdrugs.org/cocaine.htm.   6 
Established  in  1997,  UNODC  has  become  the  main  source  for  data  on 
illegal drug markets. It employs about 500 staff members worldwide and has 21 
field offices located in the main producer countries, as well as in those countries 
used as traffic corridors. The mandate of UNODC is to assist member countries 
in their struggle against illegal drugs, crime, and terrorism.
10 UNODC relies on 
voluntary contributions — mainly from just a few countries — for almost 90% of 
its budget,.
11  UNODC works jointly with the respective government institutions 
in the producer countries to undertake the “Coca Cultivation Survey” each year. 
Through  the  Illicit  Crop  Monitoring  Programme  (ICMP),  UNODC  uses  the 
interpretation  and  processing  of  satellite  images  to  monitor  illegal  crops  in 
producer  countries:  coca  in  the  three  Andean  producer  countries  and  opium 
poppy in South and East Asian countries.
12 Also, using surveys and studies on 
yields,  this  institution  produces  an  estimate  of  potential  cocaine  production, 
gathers prices of intermediate goods such as dry coca leaf and coca base, and 
collects  other  crucial  statistics  such  as  eradication  measures,  drug  shipments 
seizures, and the number of cocaine processing laboratories destroyed as reported 
by different governmental institutions in producer countries.
13  
ONDCP’s data on coca cultivation are prepared by the US Director of 
Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), and are published each 
                                                 
10 More information on the mandate of UNODC, as well as its main goals, can be obtained at: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about.html 
11 Jensema and Thoumi (2004) argue that UNODC’s large proportion of earmarked funding from a few 
donor countries biases the type of projects where the funds are spent, hampers its policy evaluation efforts 
as criticisms can easily translate into a fund shortage, and prevents the organization from experimenting 
with programs that are not in line with the donor countries’ position on illegal drug issues. Available at: 
http://www.drug-policy.org/documents/Thoumi_Jensema_paper 
12 The analysis of these images includes a number of corrections for cloud cover, spraying, dates of 
acquisition, etc. For a detailed explanation the reader is referred to the methodological description available 
in the Survey Reports for each of the Andean countries available at: 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html). 
13 Thoumi (2005a) argues that UNODC does not have enough personnel and claims that “it simply does not 
have the capability to conduct significant critical studies and to evaluate in detail the quality of the data it 
collects” (Thoumi, 2005a, p. 189). This claim, however, is backed up only by a specific criticism on a 
figure of the size of the illegal drug business ($500 billion, which was a clear overestimation) produced by 
UNODC back in 1997 when this organization was first established. The author also asserts that for the 
production of UNODC’s main substantial product, The World Drug Report, the organization relies on 
several consultants who are hired to write chapters and sections for the report, which, in some sense, 
contradicts the claim that UNODC lacks the human resources to produce significant quality statistics and 
analysis.   7 
March in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report as part of the US 
President’s determination of whether to provide assistance to drug producer and 
transit countries. In preparing its estimates of coca cultivation, CNC analyzes 
black and white, high-resolution satellite imagery and aerial photographs. These 
are taken only between November and January of each year, weather permitting. 
The satellite images and aerial photographs cover a representative area of the 
producer countries’ known or suspected drug growing areas. The technique for 
analyzing the satellite images and aerial photographs is similar to the one used to 
estimate agricultural crops throughout the United States (see GAO, 2003 and 
ONDCP, 2005). However, according to a study conducted by ONDCP in 2002, 
the  CNC’s  methodology  had  not  adopted  a  “statistically  rigorous  accuracy 
assessment, commonly known as an error rate” in its methodology to measure 
coca cultivation. Also, the technology used by CNC was inappropriate as it did 
not account for image distortions or variations in the terrain and the atmosphere, 
such  as  cloud  cover.  Following  the  recommendations  made  by  the  ONDCP’s 
study, CNC expected to have many of the recommended changes in place for its 
2002 analysis (see GAO, 2003).  
UNODC´s  methodology  for  collecting  data  on  coca  cultivation  covers 
almost the entire territories in the producer countries, whereas ONDCP´s only 
covers  a  representative  sample.  UNODC  also  makes  more  corrections  than 
ONDCP for possible biases and mistakes in the interpretation of aerial imagery. 
Finally, UNODC has been actively involved in conducting the “Coca Cultivation 
Surveys”  in  each  one  of  the  producer  countries,  which  are  complemented  by 
continous efforts to undertake field studies to update parameters such as yields 
per hectare, an important parameter for coming up with and estimating potential 
cocaine production.  Although UNODC stands as a more reliable source of data 
on coca cultivation, cocaine production, and related issues, we will be referring to 
the two data sources in the following section of the paper in order to compare 
them to each other (if possible). 
 
   8 
COCAINE PRODUCTION: STYLIZED FACTS  COCAINE PRODUCTION: STYLIZED FACTS  COCAINE PRODUCTION: STYLIZED FACTS  COCAINE PRODUCTION: STYLIZED FACTS        
 
i.  Coca Cultivation 
 
According  to  ONDCP,  coca  cultivation  in  the  three  Andean  countries 
remained relatively stable throughout the 1990s. On average, coca was cultivated 
in about 200,000 hectares in the three producer countries, but the share of each 
country in total coca cultivation changed dramatically during the decade. While 
Peru had the largest number of hectares in 1990 (about 57% of the total) and 
Colombia the lowest (19%), by 1999 these shares had completely reversed, with 
Peru having 21% of the total, Bolivia 12%, and Colombia 67% (Figure 1). On 
one  hand,  this  change  was,  in  part,  a  result  of  increasing  eradication  efforts 
undertaken by the Bolivian and Peruvian governments, and of aerial interdiction 
efforts undertaken by the Peruvian government to close the air bridge between 
coca producing centers in Peru and cocaine processing laboratories in Colombia. 
On the other hand, in Colombia, after the demise of the Medellin and Cali cartels 
by the middle of the nineties, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC)  and  the  Autodefensas  Unidas  de  Colombia  (AUC),  their  historical 
origins as leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries notwithstanding, started 
to get increasingly involved in the production and commercialization of cocaine to 
finance their insurgent activities against each other and against the Colombian 
state.
14 As a result, coca cultivation reached its highest levels ever recorded in 
Colombia  (about  163,000  hectares)  by  2001.  The  response  of  the  Colombian 
government to the large increase in coca cultivation was the implementation of 
Plan Colombia in 2001, the official name of a multi-year, comprehensive strategy 
designed  and  implemented  to  bring  about  lasting  peace  by  reducing  the 
production of illegal drugs. As a result, from 2000 to 2003 coca cultivation in 
Colombia decreased by more than 30%, whereas in Bolivia and Peru it remained 
relatively  stable.  According  to  the  latest  UNODC  and  ONDCP  reports,  total 
coca cultivation in the three producer countries has remained relatively stable in 
the  last  three  years  reported  (Figure  2  (a)  and  (b)).  Nevertheless,  ONDCP´s 
                                                 
14 See Rangel (2000) and Grossman and Mejía (2007).   9 
figures should be handled with care as they expanded by 81% the size of the 
landmass that was imaged and sampled for coca cultivation and, when the new 
areas  covered  are  taken  into  account,  there  is  an  increase  of  39,000  has. 
cultivated  with  coca.
15  As  ONDCP  claims  in  a  recent  press  release,  “Because 
these areas were not previously surveyed, it is impossible to determine for how 
long they have been under coca cultivation...The higher cultivation figure in this 
year’s estimate does not necessarily mean that coca cultivation increased in the 
last year; but rather reflects an improved understanding of where coca is now 
growing  in  Colombia.”  Summarizing,  according  to  the  two  sources,  total 
cultivation in the three Andean countries shows a large decrease between 2001 
and 2003, in large part due to the large decreased observed in Colombia after the 
implementation  of  Plan  Colombia.  And,  if  anything,  coca  cultivation  has 
remained  relatively  stable  during  the  last  three  years  reported.  Although  the 
observed figures for the last few years are not enough evidence to conclusively 
support a ballooning effect, where a decrease in cultivation in one area due to 
“effective” anti-drug policies would lead to the reallocation of crops to new areas 
and, as a result, total cultivation remains unchanged (or increases), it does send a 
warning signal of the potential for large increases in Bolivia and Peru if anti-drug 
policies and monitoring are not maintained in all areas where coca can and has 
been grown in the past (see Department of State, 2005). 
Since UNODC only started the Illicit Crop Monitoring System in Colombia in 
1999, in Peru in 2000, and in Bolivia in 2003, data between the two main sources 
of  information  can  be  compared  only  for  those  years.  Figure  3  shows  the 
evolution  of  coca  bush  cultivation  in  Colombia  according  to  the  two  main 
sources.  Although  the  levels  are  different,  with  an  almost  constant  average 
difference between the two sources of 30,000 hectares, the tendency is the same: 
first increasing between 1999 and 2000, and then decreasing until 2004. The same 
pattern is observed for Bolivia and Peru, that is, an almost constant level of coca 
cultivation  with  a  small  increasing  tendency  in  the  last  year.  However,  while 
                                                 
15 Figures 1 and 2(b) present ONDCP´s estimates of total coca cultivation preserving the sample fixed, that 
is, they do not take into account for 2005 the 81% increase in the fields surveyed.   10 
ONDCP’s estimate of coca cultivation in Colombia is larger than UNODC’s in 
the last four years, the opposite is true for Bolivia and Peru for those years when 
the two sources gathered data separately. 
 
ii.  Intermediate Prices 
 
While in Bolivia and Peru there is an active market of coca leaf, in Colombia 
the market for coca leaf is very limited because most farmers process the coca 
leaves into coca base themselves in small “kitchens” located on their farms. Thus, 
UNODC collects monthly data on prices of sun-dried coca leaf in Bolivia and 
Peru  and  of  coca  base  in  Colombia  based  on  semi-structured  interviews  of 
farmers, storekeepers, and others who participate in the cultivation of coca and 
the production of coca base. In many instances these prices are collected only in a 
few regions where coca is grown and, as a result, the selected sample may be far 
from representative and should be handled with care. For instance, during 2004 
the prices of coca leaf in Bolivia were collected only in the Yungas of La Paz in 
Bolivia by UNODC and in the Chapare region (also in Bolivia) by DIRECO, in 
13 different points in Peru, and in 5 departments in Colombia.  
The price of dried coca leaf in Bolivia and Peru increased dramatically from 
1996 to 2001. This increase in prices was the result of eradication measures taken 
by the Bolivian and Peruvian governments, as well as the efforts of the Peruvian 
government during the second half of the nineties, partially financed with US 
funding, to close the air bridge that connected the coca and coca paste-producing 
centers in Peru and the Colombian laboratories that are specialized in processing 
the coca paste into cocaine. Figures 4 (a) and (b) show the evolution of coca leaf 
prices in Bolivia and Peru respectively along with potential coca leaf production 
as calculated by UNODC based on yields per hectares. While in Bolivia, the price 
of dried coca leaf has decreased due to increased production in the last three 
years recorded (2003 through 2005), in Peru dried coca leaf prices have risen in 
the  last  few  years.  In  Colombia,  however,  despite  the  large  decrease  in  coca 
cultivation between 2001 and 2004 described above, neither the price of coca base   11 
nor coca base production have shown any increasing tendency between 2000 and 
2005 (see Figure 5). According to UNODC (2005) the price of coca base increased 
between 2001 and 2003. However, this is true only in nominal terms. The price of 
coca  base  has  been  stable  (when  seen  in  dollar  terms)  or  decreasing  (in  real 
pesos) ever since the beginning of the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2001, 
precisely  the  moment  when  coca  cultivation  started  to  decrease  rapidly. 
According to some sources, this apparent puzzle — of lower cultivation of coca 
and lower prices of coca base — can be partially explained by the offsetting effects 
of larger imports of coca paste from Peru and the large increases in productivity 
per hectare in the production of coca base.
16 The next section will elaborate on 
this and on a “twin puzzle”, namely the stability of prices of cocaine in the US 
market despite the large decrease in aggregate coca cultivation between 2000 and 
2003 in the three producer countries and a relatively stable aggregate demand for 
cocaine in the consumer countries. 
 
iii.  Potential Cocaine Production 
 
Using yields per hectare as well as technical coefficients for each of the main 
links in the cocaine production chain, UNODC produces an estimate of potential 
manufacture  of  cocaine  for  each  one  of  the  three  producer  countries  in  the 
Andean region. Until 2004 UNODC’s estimates relied on information of technical 
coefficients from other sources, the main one being Operation Breakthrough, a 
DEA project designed to estimate the amount of cocaine produced in the Andean 
region  by  examining  the  yield  and  alkaloid  content  of  coca  crops  and  the 
efficiency  of  clandestine  cocaine  producing  laboratories.  In  2004,  however, 
UNODC  started  a  series  of  field  studies  to  complement  its  crop  monitoring 
system by estimating coca leaf yields per hectare, average weight loss for sun-
dried  and  oven-dried  leaves,  and  conversion  rates  from  coca  leaf  to  cocaine, 
                                                 
16 Despite the successful closure of the air bridge between Peru and Colombia, the organizations involved 
in coca cultivation and cocaine production figured out other ways (perhaps less efficient but still profitable, 
such as transportation by river, or using mules to travel jungle paths) to move coca paste from Peru to 
Colombia (see Kawell, 2001).   12 
among others (see the Coca Cultivation Surveys for the three producer countries 
produced by UNODC in 2005 and 2006.) The implementation of these surveys, 
however,  is  often  hampered  by  the  social  tensions  prevailing  in  the  coca 
producing  regions  and  by  the  farmers’  reluctance  to  collaborate  with  the 
interviewers.  Despite  the  difficulties  in  carrying  out  these  studies,  their 
implementation is of the greatest importance, not only to better understand coca 
and its derivatives’ markets, but also to be able to evaluate the efficiency of anti-
drug  programs  and  monitor  changes  in  each  link  of  the  cocaine  production 
process.
17 
Not surprisingly, according to UNODC the main trend of potential cocaine 
production is very similar to that described above for coca cultivation, that is, a 
relatively stable total potential production of cocaine from 1990 to 1999 (at about 
850 metric tons) and then decreasing between 2000 to 2003. By 2003 cocaine 
production had reached a minimum level of about 800 metric tons due, almost 
completely, to the large decrease in potential production in Colombia (see Figure 
6 (a)). For 2004 and 2005, however, new estimates of coca leaf yields per hectare 
obtained by UNODC and the Colombian government point to worrisome results, 
namely,  that  productivity  per  hectare  has  increased  from  4.7  to  7.7    kg  per 
hectare per year (a 63% increase)
18. This new estimate — plus the sustained high 
prices of  coca leaf in Bolivia (above $5/kg) and Peru (above $2.5/kg), which 
likely created an incentive for farmers in these two countries to increase coca 
cultivation — have resulted in a large increase in the estimated potential cocaine 
production  between  2003  and  2004.  While  in  Bolivia,  potential  cocaine 
production increased by 35% in 2004 and by 23% in Peru (in the same year), in 
Colombia  it  increased  by  16%,  despite  the  reduction  in  the  number  of  coca 
cultivated hectares.  
                                                 
17 For instance, in 2004 the media reported the discovery, in the Sierra Nevada (in the northern part of 
Colombia), of a new coca variety which supposedly had higher cocaine content, a higher level of purity, 
and was also resistant to glyphosate. This new variety was seen as the response of drug traffickers to the 
intensive aerial spraying efforts by the Colombian government, with strong financial and technical support 
from the US (see McDermott, 2004). However, the Transnational Institute (TNI) has questioned the 
validity of this report arguing that “A few scientific facts provide grounds for questioning the credibility of 
this report about the cocaine alkaloid content of the coca leaf…The report’s claim that the plant is resistant 
to glyphosate is equally ambiguous” (see TNI, 2004).  
18 See UNODC (2006).   13 
Based on the most recent CNC cultivation estimates, along with the DEA’s 
coca yield and laboratory efficiency data, the US State Department also produces 
an  estimate  of  potential  cocaine  production.  According  to  this  source,  after 
reaching a peak of more than one thousand metric tons in 2001, total cocaine 
production in the Andean countries declined between 2001 and 2004 (see Figure 6 
(b)). For 2005, potential cocaine production is not comparable to prior years due 
to the fact that ONDCP includes in its calculation those newly surveyed fields 
that were not included in previous years. In fact, our own calculations suggest 
that potential cocaine production would have been 431 metric tons (the same as 
in 2004) if one does not include the new surveyed areas.  While potential cocaine 
production according to this source has remained relatively stable during the last 
three years in Bolivia and Peru (at 60 metric tons and 140 metric tons per year 
respectively), in Colombia it decreased very rapidly until 2004 and it remained 
stable  during  2005.  By  2004  and  2005  potential  cocaine  production  in  this 
country (430 MT) was about 50% of what it was in 2001 (840 MT).
19 According 
to an ONDCP report (ONDCP, 2005), the fact that potential cocaine production 
declined more rapidly than coca bush cultivation is explained by the fact that, 
since intense aerial spraying started in Colombia in 2001, there are an increasing 
proportion of coca fields that are newly planted, and these are known to be less 
productive than more mature fields. However, as we will see below, although it 
might be true that aerial spraying decreases the average age of coca fields, and 
this, in turn, decreases the yields, there is new evidence of an increase in yields 
per  hectare  coming  from  different  strategies  implemented  by  illegal  groups 
engaged in cocaine production in response to the increase eradication measures 
taken by the Colombian and US governments. 
Although  UNODC’s  and  the  State  Department’s  estimates  of  potential 
cocaine production show a similar proportional decrease between 2001 and 2003, 
the latter source shows a reversion of the decreasing trend for 2004 and 2005 due 
to higher yields per hectare, while the former shows an increase in 2005 that is 
                                                 
19 Again, without including in the calculations the 39,000 has of new surveyed fields of 2005 to make the 
data comparable to previous years.   14 
only due to an increase in the fields surveyed, and, as a result, the number for 
2005 is not really comparable to the numbers observed for previous years.  
 
iv.  Average Purity 
 
UNODC and ONDCP also gather statistics on the average purity of cocaine 
by using information from laboratories and cocaine shipment seizures in producer 
and transit countries respectively, as well as the information at the retail level 
from street seizures in consumer countries. On one hand, between 2002 and 2004 
the average purity of cocaine in the producer countries ranged between 82% and 
95% (UNODC, 2006). On the other, because purity levels in consumer countries 
are obtained from drug seizures, many times done at the retail level, the average 
purity of cocaine varies very widely, even for a given transaction size in a given 
city  and  year  (Caulkins,  1994).  Also,  the  spread  in  expected  purity  does  not 
decrease  as  the  quantities  being  transacted  increases,  and,  as  a  result,  the 
interpretation of simple averages should be handled with care (ONDCP, 2004). 
According to ONDCP, the average expected purity of cocaine
20 in the US market 
increased rapidly throughout the eighties for all quantities being transacted, then 
decreased during the first few years of the nineties and remained relatively stable 
during  the  nineties.  Finally,  in  the  last  few  years,  expected  purity  of  powder 
cocaine has increased, reaching levels of about 70% for purchases of less than two 
grams, 67% for purchases of 2 to 10 grams, and 62% for purchases of 10 to 59 
grams and of more than 50 grams (see Figure 7).
21 Although one would expect 
increasing purity levels as the quantities being transacted increases (as was in 
fact observed in the eighties), purity differences across quantity levels had almost 
disappeared in the nineties, mainly because purity levels at the highest quantities 
transacted fell. According to ONDCP (2004) this suggests that diluting cocaine 
was not as common a practice in the nineties as it was in the eighties. In fact, 
                                                 
20 Expected purity levels are based on observations obtained through purchases only and do not include 
observations from seizures and other enforcement activities (ONDCP, 2004).  
21 The same patterns are observed when information on purity levels obtained through seizures and other 
enforcement activities are also included (see Figure 8).   15 
after 1998 one observes higher purity levels for the lowest quantity purchases, 
which may come from the compositional effects from the aggregation of different 
number of transactions from higher and lower purity transactions, markets, and 
cities,  and  not  because  distributors  inside  the  US  refine  cocaine  across  the 
distribution chain (UNODC, 2004).  
According to evidence cited by Caulkins and Reuter (1998), purity levels do 
not seem to affect transaction prices at the retail level in consumer countries. 
This apparent puzzle, however, is explained by the authors with the observation 
that illegal drugs are experience goods, where the price paid is in part determined 
by the purity the buyer expects at the time of purchase based on information 
such as the size of the purchase, location, and other observable characteristics. 
Given the lack of official regulation in illegal drug markets, sellers can deceive 
costumers about the purity of the product being transacted. At the same time, 
buyers can later argue that the product was of lower quality than that agreed at 
the time of the transaction. These disputes, not surprisingly, end up many times 
generating a substantial amount of violence.
22  
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Although this chapter concentrates on cocaine production and trafficking, 
in order to say anything meaningful about the price of cocaine in world markets, 
we must briefly review demand.  
The United States, where cocaine is the second-most consumed illegal drug 
after marihuana is the main consumer country in the world. In most European 
countries,  cocaine  is  the  third  illegal  drug  consumed,  after  marihuana  and 
heroin.
23 While in the US, the annual prevalence rate of abuse in the 15 to 64-
year-old population is about 2.8%, in European countries, on average, this rate is 
                                                 
22 This is not the only link in the trafficking chain where violence arises as a method to resolve disputes. In 
fact, the recourse to violence is one prominent characteristic of organizations involved in illegal drug 
trafficking.  
23 According to UNODC (2005a) there are approximately 13.4 million cocaine users in the world. Two-
thirds are in the Americas (about 6.5 million in the US and 1.9 in South America).   16 
2.7% in Spain, 2.4% in the UK
24, 1.1% in the Netherlands, Italy and Ireland, and 
less than 0,3% in countries such as France, Sweden and Poland.  
Cocaine consumption in the US decreased rapidly between 1985 and 1993; 
since then it has remained relatively stable. While in 1985 the annual prevalence 
rate among the 12-year-olds in the general population and above was about 5.1%, 
by  1993  this  rate  had  decreased  to  about  2%.  Among  high  school  students, 
prevalence rates also decreased rapidly between 1985 and 1992: from 13.1% to 
3.1%. In the second half of the 1990’s, the prevalence rate among 12
th graders in 
the US has fluctuated between 3% and 6% (UNODC, 2005a, using information 
from SAMHSA). The percentage of the population reporting current (during the 
month  before  the  interview)  and  occasional  (one  to  eleven  times  during  the 
twelve months before the interview) use of cocaine also shows the same pattern 
(see  Figure  9).  Other  indicators,  such  as  the  trend  in  cocaine  treatment 
admissions, show a decreasing tendency of cocaine use between 1992 and 2002 
(the  last  year  recorded).  While  the  primary  admission  rate
25  for  cocaine  per 
100,000 inhabitants (age 12 or older) was about 125 in 1992, by 2002 it had 
decreased by approximately 24% to about 100 (SAMHSA, 2005).
26 Among high 
school students, the evidence on cocaine consumption trends is somehow mixed. 
While measures of 30-day prevalence rates for cocaine use among 12
th graders 
began to increase and then peaked in 1999 and then decreased until 2003 (see 
Figure 10), the perception of harmfulness of cocaine consumption
27–as perceived 
by 12
th graders–seems to have declined in the last few years recorded (University 
of Michigan (2004)). 
In  Europe,  however,  cocaine  consumption,  according  to  most  estimates, 
has been on the rise over the last few years.
28 For instance, in Spain, the country 
that shows the highest rates of cocaine consumption in Europe, the prevalence of 
                                                 
24 For the population between 16 and 59 years of age. 
25 The primary substance is the main substance reported at the time of admission. 
26 Cocaine admissions as percent of all admissions also declined from about 17.5% in 1992 to about 13% in 
2002. 
27 When they respond to the question: How much do you think people risk harming themselves (physically 
or in other ways), if they try cocaine powder once or twice, and occasionally. 
28 European countries, probably with the exception of Spain, show prevalence rates of consumption much 
lower than those in the US.   17 
cocaine use among the general population (age 15 to 64) increased from 1.5% in 
1995 to 2.7% in 2003; in the Netherlands it increased from 0.7% in 1997 to 1.1% 
in 2001; in Switzerland, cocaine use among 15- and 16-year-olds increased from 
0.9% in 1994 to 2.5% in 2002; Germany experienced an increase of cocaine use of 
the population between 18 and 64 years of age from 0.2% in 1990 to 1% in 2003 
(UNODC, 2004). 
 
COCAINE PRICES COCAINE PRICES COCAINE PRICES COCAINE PRICES       
 
The price per pure gram of cocaine decreased from more than $500 for 
purchases of two grams or less, and $200 for purchases of more than 50 grams in 
1980, to about $200 and to about $38, respectively, in 2001.
29  Since 2001 the 
price of cocaine in the US has been increasing at a relatively slow pace. These 
patterns are observed for both the US and Europe for cocaine at street purity 
(Figure 11). According to UNODC, cocaine prices, at the retail and wholesale 
level, have followed similar trends over time (Figure 12).  
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According  to  most  measures  available  until  2005,  potential  cocaine 
production showed a decreased of about 30% or more between 2000 and 2004, 
while demand in the consumer countries, if anything, had remained relatively 
stable. Yet, prices of intermediate inputs (coca leaf and coca base) in producer 
countries and of cocaine in the consumer countries had been stable or decreasing 
until then.
30 With a roughly stable demand (except in many European countries 
where cocaine consumption is rising, but is still “low” when compared to the 
                                                 
29 Caulkins and Reuter (1998) study the relative importance of the cost components in determining cocaine 
prices at the retail level. According to their estimates, a little over 50% of the cost can be attributed to risk 
(for incarceration about 24%, and for death about 30%), whereas import costs only account for about 12% 
of the retail value of cocaine, labor costs for about 13%, and costs of product and assets seizures for about 
10%. The same study also highlights the huge variability of prices across time and market levels and 
explains why enforcement interventions create only temporary spikes in prices, due to the response (in their 
words, adaptation) of suppliers.  
30 A very small increase in cocaine prices at the retail level in consumer countries (at “street purity”) is 
perceivable in the last few years recorded by UNODC (see Figure 12).    18 
prices observed in the US), lower production estimates and increasing seizures, 
increasing interception of drug shipments, and destruction of cocaine processing 
laboratories, cocaine prices would have been expected to rise or remain stable, 
and  not  fall  as  seems,  in  fact,  to  have  been  the  case  (at  least  until  new 
information became available recently). Or, as Reuter (2001, p. 18) puts it, “If 
thorough enforcement did not raise drug prices, then it might still claim success if 
it lowered availability. But the data, mostly from surveys of high school seniors, 
show  no  decrease”.  However,  in  the  process  of  writing  this  chapter,  UNODC 
released the results of field research done in Colombia where they found a large 
increase in productivity estimates. Specifically, they found that, on average, the 
number of kilograms produced by one hectare of coca in one year increased from 
4.7 to 7.7 (UNODC, 2006). This corresponds to a 40% increase in the yields per 
hectare. When this new estimates of productivity are used to calculate potential 
cocaine production they find that, although there has been a large decrease in the 
number of coca cultivated hectares in Colombia (of more than 30% between 2001 
and 2005), each hectare is now found to be more productive. As a result of these 
two factors, and as explained before, potential cocaine production in Colombia 
has not decreased as much as was thought before.  
Diagram 1a below summarizes the main changes in the market for cocaine 
between 1980 and 2005, and Diagram 1b summarizes the two opposing forces 
that have kept cocaine supply relatively stable during the last five years: first, 
eradication measures, by destroying coca crops, tend to decrease cocaine supply 
and, second, increases in productivity in the production of coca leaf and cocaine 
have  counteracted  anti-drug  policies  in  producer  countries.  Despite  the  large 
amount  of  resources  spent  on  the  war  on  drugs,  a  relatively  stable  demand 
together with the stability of cocaine supply described above have kept quantities 
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The  next  three  subsections  elaborate  on  possible  sources  of  bias  in  the 
data,  and  draw  attention  to  how  the  data  on  cocaine  production  and 
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Although  neither  UNODC  or  ONDCP  have  any  evidence  of  large-scale 
coca  cultivation  or  cocaine  production  in  countries  other  than  the  traditional 
three Andean countries, there exists some evidence concerning efforts undertaken 
by cocaine producing organizations and individuals to counteract the effects of 
anti-drug policies (such as aerial and manual eradication) in producer countries. 
For instance, peasants intermingle coca crops with legal crops to avoid the former 
from  being  detected  by  satellite  imagery.  By  doing  this,  they  avoid  both 
monitoring  and  eradication.  Also,  they  induce  a  bias  in  the  figures  of  coca 
cultivation gathered by UNODC and ONDCP (and on their respective estimates 
of  potential  cocaine  production).  Another  source  of  bias  has  to  do  with  the 
assumptions on yields and technical coefficients of transformation that UNODC 
and  ONDCP  use  in  order  to  come  up  with  an  estimate  of  potential  cocaine 
production. The possible biases could be the result of a higher density of coca 
crops,  more  efficient  planting  techniques,  the  use  of  fertilizers,  and  the 
development  of  genetically  modified  coca  plants  with  much  higher  yields.  For 
instance,  Colombian  authorities  have  recently  argued  that  coca  yields  have 
increased  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  a  new,  genetically  modified,  coca 
variety, which is supposedly much taller, of a much higher quality and  higher 
percentage of hydrochloride (more cocaine and cocaine of higher purity can be 
extracted from each leaf), and which is glyphosate resistant (McDermott, 2004).
31 
The implementation of more efficient planting techniques and the introduction of 
new fertilizers and new chemicals in the manufacturing process would also result 
in more cocaine being produced from fewer coca fields. For instance, after the 
successful  operations  to  stop  the  diversion  of  potassium  permanganate  (a 
precursor used in the manufacture of cocaine) in Colombia during the end of the 
nineties,  drug  producers  adapted  and  started  using  an  alternative  chemical 
(sodium hypochlorite), which may have resulted in higher rates of extraction and 
yields (UNODC, 2005b). 
                                                 
31 TNI (2004) quickly responded to this information by questioning its scientific validity.   21 
Although  these  possible  sources  of  bias  in  the  estimation  of  coca 
cultivation  and  potential  cocaine  production  are  hard  to  verify,  the  current 
efforts undertaken by UNODC to conduct field studies in each of the producer 
countries, in order to have better estimates of coca yields and, in general, of the 
technical coefficients of the cocaine production process, are headed in the right 
direction.  Because  profit  margins  are  extremely  high  in  the  cocaine  market, 
cocaine producers respond and adapt to anti-drug policies in different and, many 
times, smart ways. Monitoring their responses using field studies is crucial not 
only to keep track of the right numbers on the supply side, but also to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the anti-drug policies implemented. 
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While aggregate figures show that cocaine consumption has, if anything, 
remained relatively stable in the last few years in the US, and has been on the 
rise in Europe (although the prevalence rates are still much lower than in the 
US), the long-term trends in the composition of demand may shed some light on 
understanding the patterns of illegal drug use. Reuter (1999) argues that “While 
the  general  population  surveys  have  shown  very  stable  prevalence  figures 
throughout  the  1990’s,  aggregate  stability  masks  a  great  deal  of  change  in 
patterns of drug use.”  
As was the case with opium in the past, patterns of cocaine consumption 
may exhibit a life cycle. There are many reasons to expect a life cycle for drug 
consumption. Among the most obvious ones are fashion and learning. As Levitt 
and Dubner (2005, p. 109) put it when they analyze the financial structure of 
drug gangs in the US, “In the 1970s, if you were the sort of person who did 
drugs,  there  was  no  classier  drug  than  cocaine.  Beloved  by  rock  stars, 
moviemakers, ballplayers and even the occasional politician, cocaine was a drug 
of power and panache.” According to Reuter (2001), the low prices of cocaine 
have not led to a new epidemic of cocaine consumption because cocaine is no 
longer a fashionable drug. Cocaine consumption is seen now as a dangerous drug   22 
and “there are enough miserable looking cocaine addicts on the streets of bad 
neighborhoods to make the case for the drug’s perils to any moderately rational 
youth.” (Reuter, 2001, p. 18). Statistics such as the average age of cocaine users 
in the US (the biggest market for cocaine) favor this explanation. For instance, 
hospital and coroner data show the aging of cocaine users. Also, trends in the 
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) data show that the average cocaine-
using offender is not only getting older, but also sicker. This evidence, together 
with  increasing  incarceration  rates,  has  led  to  a  slowly  declining  number  of 
cocaine (and heroin) addicts.
32 Additional evidence also suggests that “a greater 
proportion of cocaine-using population is dependent—a finding that is consistent 
with the observation that cocaine users developed their habits over time and are 
now experiencing the problems that stem from long-term use” (see Reuter, 1999). 
What this evidence–the composition of cocaine demand by age groups and by 
occasional vs. dependent users–suggests is that the problem of cocaine use, at 
least in the US, is “increasingly a problem of long term users who developed their 
habits in the early stages of the epidemic” (ADAM report, 1997, cited in Reuter, 
1999). However, it should be noted that the low prices of cocaine currently being 
observed, when compared to historical prices, might be inducing new users to try 
cocaine and may spur its consumption once again in the near future. The latest 
available indicators of cocaine consumption among 8th to 12
th graders in the US 
show a worrisome picture: trends in 30-day and annual prevalence of cocaine and 
crack use increased for 10
th and 12
th graders in 2004, and the disapproval among 
12
th  graders  of  people  using  cocaine  occasionally  or  regularly,  as well  as  their 
perception  of  risks  in  using  cocaine,  have  decreased  (University  of  Michigan, 
2004).  
The long-term trends in the composition of cocaine demand by age group 
and  by  occasional  vs.  dependent  consumers  illustrates  an  important  issue, 
namely, that the consumption of cocaine, as observed in the past for other drugs 
such as opium, may exhibit a life cycle. Furthermore, if the life cycle hypothesis 
is true, the relative stability of cocaine demand aggregate figures, plus the aging 
                                                 
32 See the analysis in Reuter (2001).   23 
of cocaine consumers, at least in the US, might indicate future declines in the 
consumption of cocaine in this country.  
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After the demise of the Medellin and Cali cartels during the 1990’s, new 
players  entered  the  cocaine  production  and  commercialization  business  in 
Colombia  by  the  end  of  the  decade  (when  Colombia  was  already  the  largest 
producer of cocaine). These new cartels, such as the Norte del Valle cartel, the 
Costa cartel, and the different guerrilla and paramilitary fronts, are characterized 
for being smaller and having a relatively more widespread command structure. In 
other words, it is no longer true that the production and commercialization of 
cocaine is controlled by a few drug lords such as Pablo Escobar or the Rodriguez 
Orejuela  brothers.  Instead,  one  can  argue  (based  on  “informed”  anecdotal 
evidence)  that  after  the  demise  of  the  Medellin  and  Cali  cartels,  cocaine 
production and commercialization is controlled by a larger group of less visible 
organizations. This, in turn, may have induced greater competition between the 
new groups in control of the cocaine trade, lower profit margins (but still huge), 
and  lower  prices.  Greater  competition  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  cocaine 
trafficking  chain  may  have  counteract  the  effects  of  anti-drug  policies 
implemented in producer countries and, as a result, may have prevented cocaine 
wholesale prices (that is, prices recorded at consumer countries’ borders) from 
going up.  
Yet another, perhaps related, explanation posed by UNODC (2005a) is the 
use of cocaine stocks to “fuel” drug markets while the actual surge in anti-drug 
policies lasts. In other words, organizations involved in cocaine commercialization 
have been running down their stocks of cocaine with the expectation that the 
current level of anti-drug policies cannot last much longer. However, there is no 
significant evidence to support this explanation. In any case, if it were true, the 
stocks “should be soon exhausted and a contraction of the market should then 
become visible.” (UNODC, 2005a).    24 
While  it  is  very  hard,  if  not  impossible,  to  directly  verify  some  of  the 
above explanations due to obvious reasons including the lack of price records and 
transaction quantities at each of the different commercialization stages (or the 
lack of access to the drug traffickers’ accounting books), the availability of better 
and  more  reliable  data  on  coca  cultivation,  yields,  consumption,  etc.–as  it 
becomes available–will help clarify the validity of other possible explanations. 
Specifically, field studies in coca growing regions such as the ones currently being 
cunducted by UNODC, will continue to help clarify whether there has been an 
increase  in  yields,  better  planting  techniques,  etc.  In  other  words,  better 
assesments of productivity parameters (and how they change over time) are key 
to understanding the cocaine market. And, going back one step in the cocaine 
production chain, field studies would be very helpful to confront the measures of 
coca cultivation obtained from satellite images with those that would be obtained 
directly  in  the  fields.  This  is  because,  as  explained  above,  there  is  anecdotal 
evidence  that  coca  growers  have  found  ways  to  avoid  being  detected  by  the 
satellite  images,  and  therefore,  the  measures  obtained  from  satellite  pictures 
might  be  biased  downwards.  Random,  in-the-field  measures  will  provide  an 
estimate of this bias. Also crucial for the analysis of the cocaine market is the 
understanding  of  the  response  of  drug  producers  to  anti-drug  policies.  The 
following section elaborates this point. 
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Anti-drug  policies  in  the  three  producer  countries  have  had  different 
emphases in the past few years. In Colombia, anti-drug policies have focused on a 
combination of strategies: from attempts to prevent coca cultivation (using aerial 
spraying  of  herbicides  over  coca  fields  and  alternative  development  and  crop 
substitution  programs),  to  disrupting  the  cocaine  manufacture  and 
commercialization  chain  (by  interdicting  drug  shipments,  destroying  the 
infrastructure  used  for  cocaine  production  and  transportation  such  as  cocaine 
processing laboratories, landing strips and small airplanes). In Bolivia and Peru,   25 
where  aerial  spraying  of  herbicides  is  forbidden by  the  law,  anti-drug  policies 
have focused mainly on alternative development programs and manual (forced or 
voluntary) eradication campaigns. Interdiction of drug shipments, especially of 
coca  paste,  has  been  an  important  component  in  the  fight  against  cocaine 
production in Peru and Bolivia, especially in the last few years where interdiction 
has  increased  rapidly,  probably  due  to  the  increased  cultivation  triggered  by 
higher prices of coca leaf in these two countries. Peru also made huge efforts at 
the end of the nineties by disrupting the air bridge between coca base producers 
and Colombian manufacturers of cocaine. According to most sources, it was the 
combination  of  these  policies,  together  with  a  set  of  well-targeted  alternative 
livelihood programs in coca growing regions that reduced coca cultivation in Peru 
from 115,000 hectares in 1995 to about 48,000 in 2005.  
In  Bolivia  and  Peru,  where  many  farmers’  livelihood  depends  on  coca 
cultivation, the government has implemented alternative development programs 
in  well-defined  coca  growing  regions.  These  programs  seek  to  provide  the 
necessary incentives so that farmers abandon coca cultivation and engage in the 
cultivation of legal crops. These incentives take the form of monthly payments 
for not engaging in coca cultivation and/or assistance in the development of new 
(legal)  agricultural  activities.  Although  these  programs  have  been  relatively 
successful  at  the  local  level,  their  dependence  on  continuing  national  and 
international  funding  undermines  their  potential  success  in  the  long  run. 
Governments  in  the  three  producer  countries  often  rely  on  funding  from 
developed countries to finance alternative livelihood programs and have to decide 
which  regions  to  allocate  the  scarce  funding,  at  the  expense  of  experiencing 
increases in coca cultivation in those regions that cannot be targeted with these 
programs (UNODC, 2005a). For instance, after the implementation of alternative 
development programs in Aguatya and Bajo Huallaga (the two regions in Peru 
with  the  largest  proportion  of  coca  cultivation  during  the  nineties),  coca 
cultivation had almost disappeared by 2004. Nevertheless, the high prices of coca 
leaf  induced  coca  growers  in  other  regions  without  any  form  of  government 
attention  (in the  form  of  alternative programs,  health  and  education  services,   26 
etc.) to increase coca cultivation. As a result, coca cultivation, if anything, has 
remained relatively stable in Peru during the last six years.  
UNODC together with government agencies in producer countries collect 
statistics on the number of eradicated hectares of coca crops. As explained before, 
in  Peru  and  Bolivia  eradication  is  done  manually,  whereas  in  Colombia  it  is 
mostly done by aerial spraying of herbicides in the coca fields.
33 This accounts for 
the  difference  between  the  average  number of  eradicated  hectares  per  year  in 
Bolivia  (about  10,100  has  per  year  between  1999  and  2005)  and  Peru  (about 
9,800  has  per  year),  compared  to  Colombia  (close  to  110,000  has  per  year). 
Eradication  in  the  three  countries  is  undertaken  by  governmental  entities 
(DIRECO in Bolivia, DIRAN–Antinarcotics Police–in Colombia, and CORAH 
and  DEVIDA  for  forced  and  voluntary  eradication  respectively  in  Peru)  with 
technical and financial support from the US government. Figures 13 (a, b, and c) 
show the number of eradicated hectares, as reported by each of the governmental 
entities  in  charge  of  eradication  in  Bolivia,  Colombia  and  Peru  respectively, 
together with the estimated number of hectares cultivated with coca bush for the 
each of three producer countries, as reported by UNODC.  
As the aerial eradication campaigns in Colombia were intensified after the 
implementation  of  Plan  Colombia,  those  individuals  and  organizations  who 
benefit from coca cultivation (and cocaine production) have figured out ways of 
counteracting  these  campaigns.  Because  spraying  with  aerial  herbicides  is 
prohibited in national parks in Colombia, there has been a rapid increase in coca 
cultivation in National Parks.
34 The same pattern has been observed in Bolivia 
and  Peru,  where  farmers  have  sought  remote  or  protected  areas  for  coca 
cultivation as a result of the government’s pressure to reduce coca cultivation in 
the existing centers of cultivation. According to UNODC (2005b), between 2003 
and 2004, cultivation in national parks in Bolivia increased by more than 70% 
and, during the same time, cultivation increased by 53% in protected and forest 
areas in Peru (see UNODC (2005b) for Bolivia and Peru)).  
                                                 
33 See González (2006) for a thorough description of aerial eradication programs in Colombia. 
34 However, at the time this chapter was being written, the Colombian government was evaluating the 
possibility of lifting the ban on aerial eradication campaigns in national parks.    27 
Individuals involved in the cocaine production business have created many 
other ways of counteracting eradication campaigns: prune operations right after 
aerial spaying (where the coca plant is cut at one foot above the ground and then 
grows rapidly), intermingling coca crops with legal crops to avoid being detected, 
spraying coca plants with substances such as molasses to prevent the herbicide 
from  destroying  the  leaves  of  the  plant,  and  the  development  of  genetically 
modified  coca  plants  that  supposedly  are  resistant  to  the  herbicides  currently 
being used. 
But  aerial  spraying,  forced  eradication,  and  alternative  development 
programs are not the only measures taken by producer countries to fight illegal 
drug production and trafficking. Other policies include, but are not limited to: 
curtailing  the  flow  of  raw  materials  used  in  the  cultivation  of  coca  and  the 
processing of cocaine, discovering and destroying the small local workshops and 
laboratories where coca base is processed, destroying the landing strips used by 
trafficking organizations to ship drugs, interdicting drug shipments, dismantling 
the drug cartels and the networks and (many times fake) firms that are created 
for  the  money  laundering  of  the  proceeds  obtained  from  the  (huge)  profits 
derived from illegal drug trafficking.  
Available measures of the efforts undertaken in these other fronts on the 
war on drugs show an increasing number of operations against the different links 
in  the  cocaine  production  and  trafficking  chain.  For  instance,  coca  base  and 
cocaine  seizures  have  increased  in  the  past  few  years  in  all  the  producer 
countries. Figures 14 (a) and (b) show coca base and cocaine seizures in Bolivia 
and  Colombia  respectively.  Other  measures  such  as  the  number  of  destroyed 
illegal  laboratories  used  for  processing  coca  paste  and  cocaine  also  show 
increasing efforts to combat illegal drug production (see Figures 15 (a) and (b) 
for Bolivia and Colombia respectively
35).
36 Cocaine seizures have increased rapidly 
                                                 
35 For Peru, the numbers of illegal laboratories destroyed are: 964 in 2003 and 861 in 2004.  
36 See the UNODC (2005b - Coca Cultivation Surveys for each of the producer countries) for other 
measures of recent success in the war against cocaine production and trafficking. For the case of Colombia, 
the Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes – DNE publishes every year a summary of results in the war 
against illegal drug production in Colombia (see DNE, 2004).   28 
in the three producer countries as well as in the US in the last few years (see 
Figure 16). 
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The  implementation  of  anti-drug  policies  has  important  side  effects  in 
producer countries. Forced eradication measures (either manual or through aerial 
spraying campaigns) target, by definition, the first link in the cocaine production 
chain.  But  one  can  argue,  perhaps  convincingly,  that  of  all  those  involved  in 
cocaine production and commercialization, the peasants are perhaps the ones who 
receive the fewest benefits. Most coca cultivation in the three producer countries 
takes  place  in  remote  and  isolated  areas  that  lack  any  form  of  government 
infrastructure, public education, or health services.
37 In other words, eradication 
measures target those who are most vulnerable to negative income shocks and, as 
a  result,  have  created  social  pressure  against  them,  which  has  many  times 
resulted in uprising and riots such as the ones recently observed in Bolivia.
38  As 
Sherret  (2005)  suggests,  the  lack  of  coordination  between  aerial  spraying 
campaigns (or any form of forced eradication), alternative development programs, 
and  state-financed  development  infrastructure  in  the  coca  growing  areas 
evidences  “a  larger  pattern  of  neglect  and  disregard  for  those  affected  by 
centrally directed policies.” (Sherret, 2005, p. 164).   
One  of  the  most  debated  issues  regarding  the  side  effects  of  anti-drug 
policies has to do with the environmental effects of aerial spraying of herbicides 
to destroy coca bushes in Colombia. Considerable debate has been generated, in 
Colombia and abroad, over the use of aerial spraying of herbicides to combat 
illegal drug production. As Lauret Sherret noted recently, “The controversy over 
the health effects of the use of glyphosate herbicides often centers on anecdotal 
evidence gathered from people living in the areas subject to fumigation versus the 
scientific  evidence  obtained  from  laboratory  experimentation...,  and  when  the 
                                                 
37 See Contraloria General de la República (2001). 
38 See Stoner (2004) and Lindsay (2003).   29 
political agendas (of the interested parties) are taken into account, the layers of 
complexity around this problem are only exacerbated” (Sharret, 2005, p. 157). 
The  Anti-Narcotics  Police  in  Colombia  have  used  aerial  fumigation  for 
more than a decade, but since the implementation of Plan Colombia (with strong 
funding from the US) aerial spraying campaigns have intensified, especially in the 
southern  part  of  the country  where  most  of  the  coca  is  produced.  A  formula 
known  as  Roundup  (a  mixture  of  glyphosate,  the  active  ingredient  in  the 
herbicide,  and  Cosmo-Flux,  a  surfactant  that  is  used  to  aid  the  herbicide  in 
penetrating the waxy cuticle of coca leaves) is used by the Antinarcotics Police in 
the aerial eradication campaigns. It affects the leaves of the coca plants, but not 
its  roots  or  the  soil,  and  as  a  result,  “the  bush  can  be  subject  of  a  prune 
operation at about one feet over the ground to obtain a renewal of the bush in 
about six months.” (UNODC, 2005b). With an herbicide concentration of 10.4 
liters per hectare of coca approved by the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Council, the 
spraying effectiveness is estimated to be above 90%. Common effects on humans, 
as  reported  by  those  people  affected,  are  fever,  eye  irritation,  gastrointestinal 
irritation and diarrhea, skin irritation, and dizziness.  
However, the available evidence regarding the effect of aerial spraying of 
Roundup is quite diverse. A recent study by OEA (2005) argues that the health 
effects on people from the use of glyphosate and Cosmo-Flux are minimal, and 
the exposure and frequency of exposure are very low. The same study also argues 
that the effects on wildlife, mammals, and birds are negligible. This study only 
finds evidence of a moderate adverse effect on some aquatic animals in those 
localities  where  coca  is  grown  and  where  still  water  is  present.  Yet,  another 
report prepared by the Center for International Policy (CIP) and NGO’s from 
Colombia and Ecuador, argues against the use of the Roundup formula for aerial 
eradication of coca crops because it “has not been subject to scientific studies to 
determine its effects on the environment and human health, which goes against 
the  principle  of  environmental  precaution”  (CIP,  2004,  p.  139,  author’s 
translation).  The  study  cites  evidence  from  peasants  who  claim  to  have  been 
affected by aerial spraying campaigns in different ways: skin irritation, allergies,   30 
eye, nose and throat irritations, nausea, and diarrhea.
39 The study also repeatedly 
argues that the aerial campaigns in Putumayo and Caqueta, the departments in 
southern Colombia with the highest density of coca cultivation in the peak years 
of 2000 and 2001, have been indiscriminate and many times have destroyed legal 
crops, such as yucca, sugar cane, and plantains, which, according to anecdotal 
evidence from the peasants cited in the report, leaves them without any means of 
subsistence.  Although  CIP’s  report  extensively  describes  the  effects  of  aerial 
fumigation  with  glyphosate  on  human  health  and  the  environment,  it  barely 
mentions  the  negative  environmental  effects  that  coca  cultivation  and  cocaine 
production themselves have on the environment.  
Perhaps the most independent and thorough review on the environmental 
and health effects of aerial spraying of glyphosate is that of Sherret (2005). This 
study  explains  the  crucial  distinction  between  the  active  herbicide  (glyhosate) 
and its commercially available formulations. The distinction is important because 
the  formula  (which,  as  explained  before,  is  a  combination  of  glyphosate  and 
surfactants)  exhibits  synergism–when  the  observed  effects  of  two  chemicals 
being  used  together  is  greater  than  the  effects  of  those  chemicals  used 
individually.  Many  times,  the  instructions  for  use  of  glyphosate  and  its 
formulations are violated, a point that is shared by most of the studies (see, for 
instance,  Sherret,  2005  and  CIP,  2004),  and  it  is  precisely  the  misuse  of  the 
herbicide  that  causes  harmful  health  and  environmental  effects.  For  instance, 
among the many instructions stated by the manufacturer of the formula used in 
Colombia, it is stated that Roundup should be applied at distances not longer 
than 2 to 3 meters from the tallest plant, a recommendation that is many times 
violated, not only because of difficult topographic conditions, but most of the 
times to reduce the probability of airplanes used for spraying campaigns being hit 
by gunfire from the illegal organizations that benefit from the cocaine production 
and trafficking business. As a result of being unable to spray coca crops from the 
                                                 
39 According to Sherret (2005), “The governments of Colombia and the US have claimed on numerous 
occasions that supporters of the insurgent and counterinsurgent groups, who derive much of their income 
from the narcotics industry, are responsible for most of the health complaints that have received so much 
attention.”   31 
recommended  height,  oftentimes  the  herbicides  end  up  affecting  legal  crop 
plantations, water sources, and other sites not targeted by the aerial eradication 
campaigns.  
The  study  by  Sherret  (2005)  also  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  most 
harmful  environmental  effects,  so  far  identified  by  scientific  evidence,  are  on 
aquatic organisms and amphibians, when glyphosate formulations are, perhaps 
mistakenly, applied to aquatic ecosystems.  
The environmental costs of cocaine production are also an important side 
effect of anti-drug policies. More precisely, the criminalization of coca cultivation 
and cocaine production also create environmental costs because. Because cocaine 
production  is  illegal,  it  is  an  activity  which  is  not  subject  to  government 
environmental regulations.   According to John Walters, the director of ONDCP, 
“600 million liters of so-called precursor chemicals are used annually in South 
America  for  cocaine  production.  To  increase  yields,  coca  growers  use  highly 
poisonous  herbicides  and  pesticides,  including  paraquat.  Processors  also 
indiscriminately discard enormous amounts of gasoline, kerosene, sulfuric acid, 
ammonia,  sodium  bicarbonate,  potassium  carbonate,  acetone,  ether,  and  lime 
onto the ground and into nearby waterways.” (Walters, 2002). Although John 
Walters  uses  this  evidence  to  complain  to  those  who  criticize  the  aerial 
eradication campaigns, both the environmental costs of aerial eradication, and of 
coca cultivation and cocaine production have a more fundamental root: the illegal 
nature of these activities. If cocaine production were legalized, the cultivation of 
coca and the production of cocaine would be managed as any other crop. They 
would be regulated, and no chemicals would have to be sprayed to destroy the 
crops.    Further  and  independent  research  is  needed  to  estimate  and  better 
understand not only the environmental effects of aerial spraying of glyphosate, 
but  also  the  environmental  costs  of  cocaine  production.  Together  they  will 
provide  a  picture  of  the  environmental  costs  of  the  criminalization  of  coca 
cultivation and cocaine production. 
But  eradication  measures  are  not  the  only  measures  that  generate 
resistance  and  controversy  due  to  its  side  effects.  Policies  such  as  those   32 
implemented by the Peruvian government during the second half of the nineties, 
which aimed at closing the air bridge used to transport unrefined coca paste from 
coca growing regions in Peru to refining laboratories in Colombia, did not escape 
fatal accidents. Closing the air bridge not only involved destroying landing strips 
(which were easily constructed somewhere else at a relatively low cost) but also 
shooting down small airplanes suspected of carrying illegal drugs. However, the 
airplanes  that  were  shot  down  by  the  Peruvian  Air  Force  (using  information 
provided by US surveillance planes) were not always carrying illegal drugs, and 
sometimes resulted in deadly accidents involving innocent people.
 40  
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There are perhaps too many issues regarding the sustainability of anti-
drug policies in producer countries to be discussed in this chapter. However it is 
worth mentioning a few. On one hand, there is the question of who should bear 
the costs of alternative livelihood programs and eradication activities? Producer 
or consumer countries? While governments in the producer countries face internal 
pressure  from  farmers  who  claim,  perhaps  sincerely,  that  their  only  way  of 
subsistence is the cultivation of coca
41, they also face external pressure from the 
consumer countries to fight against the production of illegal drugs (in the form, 
for instance, of the threat of being labeled a “narco-state” by the international 
community, or of not being “certified” by the United States’ State Department 
each  year).  But,  besides  being  an  illegal  activity,  cocaine  production  and 
trafficking have had direct links with terrorist and insurgent activities, especially 
in the case of Colombia. Most probably, if producer countries stop fighting the 
drug trade and consumer countries do not penalize them for doing this, the price 
of cocaine would drop dramatically and the drug business would no longer be a 
source  of  financial  resources  for  illegal  armed  groups  in  producer  countries.  
                                                 
40 See, for instance, Kawell (2001). 
41 See CIP (2004).   33 
There is enough evidence of the involvement of guerrilla and paramilitary groups 
in illegal drug production and trafficking to finance their war against each other 
and against the Colombian state.
42  
The funds to fight against the production of illegal drugs are limited and 
many  times  the  governments  in  producer  countries  have  to  sacrifice  other, 
perhaps more productive, investments in order to finance the war against drugs. 
Also, funds provided by consumer countries (mostly developed economies) are 
often earmarked to be spent on predetermined activities, which leave little or no 
room for governments to allocate the funds to its most productive use in the war 
against drugs. In Colombia, for instance, most of the support provided by the US 
government comes in the form of small airplanes that can only be used for the 
spraying of herbicides in coca fields, in training programs for the pilots, and in 
the  form  of  technical  support  to  identify  coca  fields.  These  imposed  political 
constraints  create  inefficiencies  in  the  allocation  of  funds,
43  as  well  as 
environmental and social problems in the producer countries, which are not taken 
into account by the producer countries at the time of earmarking the aid for 
specific anti-drug policies. 
The last section posed some questions regarding the side effects (costs) of 
anti-drug policies (on health, the environment, and the fiscal sustainability), but 
any analysis of their sustainability should also evaluate their results. The fact 
that  cocaine  is  an  addictive  drug  is  perhaps  the  crucial  determinant  of  how 
effective the reduction of cocaine supply is in decreasing the availability of illegal 
drugs in the consumer countries. As Echeverry (2004) argues, “the efficacy (of 
the war on drugs) lies on a variable that measures consumer’s responsiveness to 
price  increases,  i.e.  the  price  elasticity  of  demand”.
44  The  rationale  for  this 
argument is very simple: if the elasticity of demand for illegal drugs — which 
captures the percentage increase in demand due to a 1% decrease in the price — is 
low enough (which, at first sight, seems to be the case for those goods that create 
                                                 
42 See, among others, Rangel (2000), Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Thoumi (2003), Bottía (2003), and Diaz 
and Sanchez (2004). 
43 See Grossman and Mejía (2007). 
44 See Becker et al. (2004).   34 
addiction) so that any decrease in the supply would translate into a sufficiently 
large increase in the price of illegal drugs, then those policies aimed at reducing 
illegal drug production may be self-defeating, as they create a greater incentive 
for producing (and trafficking) the good. In other words, the same policies that 
aim to reduce the supply of illegal drugs, by inducing further increases in the 
price, fuel more production and lead to more violence.
45  However, the scarcity of 
data on prices and quantities of cocaine transacted makes available estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand unreliable. While most available empirical studies 
have  found  a  short-run  elasticity  of  demand  less  than  one  in  absolute  value 
(Saffer  and  Chaloupka,  1999;  Chaloupka  et  al.,  1999;  DeSimone and  Farrelly, 
2003), other studies have found evidence of a higher response of cocaine demand 
to price changes (Caulkins, 1996). Using a rational addiction framework (where, 
in addition to the goods being addictive, peer pressure to consume the good plays 
an important role, and current consumption does not only depend on past but 
also on future consumption),
46 Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) estimate a long-
run price elasticity of demand for cocaine of about —1.35.
47 Whether the price 
elasticity of demand for cocaine is higher than one in absolute value, or whether 
this is true in the short or in the long run, should be on the agenda for future 
research as better data becomes available. But, even if it were true that cocaine 
demand is elastic to price changes in the long run, there is still the question of 
whether  producer  countries  can  sustain  the  high  levels  of  expenditures  (in 
eradication programs, alternative development projects, interdiction efforts, etc.) 
observed  in  the  last  few  years    in  the  war  against  cocaine  production  and 
trafficking.
48 Also important is the evaluation of the results and, as mentioned 
above,  the  understanding  of  those  measures  taken  by  drug  producers  and 
traffickers  to  counteract  anti-drug  policies.  As  we  saw  before,  although 
eradication  measures  undertaken  under  Plan  Colombia  have  decreased  the 
number  of  cultivated  hectares,  drug  producers  have  responded  with  better 
                                                 
45 See the framework developed in Becker et al. (2004). 
46 See Becker and Murphy (1988). 
47 However, when individual-specific fixed effects are included, this elasticity reduces to about –0.67. See 
also a related explanation in DeSimone and Farrelly (2003). 
48 See Echeverry (2004).   35 
planting  techniques,  have  moved  to  new  territories,  have  come  up  with  coca 
plants that have a much higher yield, etc. The reason for these responses is very 
simple: because cocaine production and trafficking is illegal, the profit margins 
are huge (the price of 1 gram of cocaine in producer countries is approximately 
one tenth of its weight in gold and that same gram in the streets of Chicago or 
New  York  sells  for  as  much  as  ten  times  its  weight  in  gold)  and,  thus,  the 
resources  that  drug  producers  are  willing  to  invest  in  counteracting  anti-drug 
policies are also huge. 
Yet another argument for the limits of supply side controls says that these 
policies are doomed from the beginning, because prices of coca leaf are just a 
negligible fraction of retail prices in consumer countries (the costs of coca leaf 
required to produce one kg of cocaine is between $300 and $500, whereas that 
kilogram at the retail level could sell at $150.000 in the US at average purity 
levels).
49 The argument is that even if refiners had to pay twice or three times as 
much to purchase the coca leaf required to produce one kilogram of cocaine, and 
if this extra cost is passed along, the increase in retail prices would be negligible. 
As a result, “if retail prices do not rise, then total consumption in the United 
States will not decline as a consequence of eradication.” (Reuter, 2001, p. 19). 
According to the same author, alternative development programs are also subject 
to the same incompleteness as that for eradication, because they assume that 
cocaine refiners will not increase the price sufficiently to tempt farmers back to 
coca growing.  
On  one  hand,  any  sound  and  sustainable  policy  that  aims  at  reducing 
cocaine production and trafficking by fighting the first link in the chain (coca 
cultivation) should, at least, coordinate strategies between the carrots (such as 
the  provision  of  incentives  to  farmers  to  abandon  coca  cultivation  through 
alternative  livelihood  opportunities,  and  better  education  and  public  health 
provision)  and  the  sticks  (the  credible  commitment  on  the  part  of  the 
government of being not only willing, but also able, to take measures such as 
forced eradication and interdiction measures to sufficiently increase the costs of 
                                                 
49 See Reuter (2001).   36 
engaging in the production of cocaine). On the other hand, if consumer countries 
are unwilling to take measures such as legalizing the use of illegal hard drugs (as 
seems to have been the case), but at the same time want to reduce the inflow of 
these  illegal  drugs  to  their  markets,  increasing  amounts  of  funds  will  be 
necessary, not only to finance the implementation of anti-drug policies to curtail 
production and trafficking in producer countries, but also to implement policies 
aimed  at  reducing  the  demand  for  illicit  drugs.  Policies  aimed  at  teaching 
potential cocaine users about the dangers induced by the consumption of cocaine, 
and at treating hard core cocaine users seem to be much more cost effective than 
trying to curtail the supply of cocaine at its source. A recent study by Caulkins, 
et al. (2005) finds that consumption can be reduced more cheaply in the United 
States by treating heavy users than by three alternative enforcement measures 
usually carried out: control of supply in the producer countries, interdiction of 
drug  shipments  and  drug  seizures,  and  conventional  enforcement  measures. 
Demand reduction programs have a wide range of action. Among others they 
seek to prevent and reduce the use of illicit drugs, treat the addicted and reduce 
the  consequences  of  drug  abuse,  and  increase  the  public’s  awareness  of 
vulnerability  and  risks  associated  with  drug  consumption  by  disseminate 
information  regarding  the  harmful  effects  of  drugs  in  local  communities  and 
schools. Policies aimed at reducing consumption also make it less likely that drug 
users switch to alternative drugs when the one they are using is not available.  
If the legalization of drugs is not possible, perhaps due to political agendas 
in consumer and producer countries, efforts to reduce the supply and the demand 
should be undertaken together. That is, each one carried out in isolation will not 
work because they are complementary. For instance, in times of supply shortages 
drug prices may increase and purity levels decline, and it is more likely that, 
first, chronic users will seek treatment, and, second, potential new users will have 
less opportunity to obtain drugs. Also, as the demand for cocaine goes down as a 
result  of  programs  to  reduce  consumption,  there  are  fewer  addicts  and  the 
criminal networks in charge of selling drugs might be weakened, which in turn 
makes it more costly for drug traffickers to smuggle illicit drugs and to make   37 
them  available  to  consumers.    Drug  substitution  therapies  and  personalized 
therapeutic programs decrease the cost to drug addicts of seeking treatment and 
decrease the number of users under the influence of criminal organizations, which, 
in  turn  has  implications  for  the  cost  to  criminal  organizations  of  supplying 
drugs.
50 
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  “Many  tens  of  billions”  is  probably  the  right  figure  for  cocaine 
expenditures  per  year  in  consumer  countries.
51  Close  to  14  million  people  are 
cocaine consumers in the world. Two thirds of these are in the Americas. Only 
three  countries  in  the  world  produce  cocaine:  Bolivia,  Colombia  and  Peru. 
Potential cocaine production in 2004 was estimated to be about 650 metric tons. 
A pure gram of cocaine is worth, at the retail level in consumer countries, as 
much as ten times its weight in gold. In producer countries, the same gram is 
worth, on average, slightly more than one tenth of its weight in gold.  While 
these figures might be striking enough by themselves to generate interest in the 
topic, they hide huge complexities. Clearly, a thorough understanding of those 
complexities requires accurate data and relevant information about the market 
for cocaine.  
The main purposes of this chapter was to provide a thorough review of 
what we know (and what we do not) about cocaine production and trafficking. 
By describing the available data on cocaine production and trafficking, the 
collection methodologies, and some of the possible biases (and what may cause 
them), we have taken an important step toward understanding the complexities 
and puzzles that should drive future research into our knowledge of illegal drug 
production and trafficking. Additionally, the chapter described some puzzles that 
arise from the available data, and studied some of the hypotheses that may help 
explain these puzzles. Furthermore, the chapter explained the policies to fight 
against cocaine production and trafficking implemented in producer countries, the 
                                                 
50 See INCB, 2004. 
51 $35 billion is the low-end estimate and $115 billion the high-end estimate (see Reuter and Greenfield, 
2001)   38 
results  of  these  policies,  and  the  role  of  consumer  countries  in  their 
implementation.  Finally,  the  chapter  reviews  and  studies  the  side  effects, 
sustainability, and future prospects of anti-drug policies. 
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Figure 3 Figure 3 Figure 3 Figure 3       
 Source: UNODC and ONDCP
Coca bush cultivation in Colombia 
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Figure 5 Figure 5 Figure 5 Figure 5       
 Source: UNODC
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Figure 6 Figure 6 Figure 6 Figure 6       
 Source: UNODC           Source: ONDCP
* ONDCP´s  figures on potential cocaine production in 2005 for Colombia include new surveyed fields and, as a result, potential  
cocaine production is not comparable with years prior to 2005.
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Figure 7 
   * Based on information from only the first two quarter of this year.
    Source: ONDCP (2004), based on STRIDE.
Average expected purity of powder cocaine in the US




























   * Based on information from only the first two quarter of this year.
    Source: ONDCP (2004), based on STRIDE.
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Figure 9 
* change in methodology: from paper-and-pencil to computer assisted inteviews.
** methodological changes in the survey
*,** : results prior to 1999 and the ones after 2002 are not comparable to other years.
Source: ONDCP.
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Figure 10 
   Source: Monitoring the Future Study (University of Michigan)
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Figure 11 
* Based on information from only the first two quarter of this year.
  Source: ONDCP
Average price of one pure gram of powder cocaine in the US
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Figure 14 
(a)                                                                  (b) 
   Source: UNODC and FELCN.    Source: UNODC and DNE.
Colombia 
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Figure 16 
Source: ONDCP and DEA.
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